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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
RICHARD WARENSKI, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 380293-CA 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of" Appeals has jurisdiction 
^ui^uai.. uo Section 73-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotate:! I^ S'-fi? 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Q O ^ -^ } o H ] .° '^ . "M° I r l -» t- i o n t ^\ r i ie-iree ?*\ - v , 
^ a t e - 1 friended. 3eferv1ai~ -» i r - i r . i ^ ) J 
3 1 , • i ? oc? i i . c i i O f ? 1 
was filed on May 3, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
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GUILTY? 
III. SHOULD DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION BE REVERSED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW? 
STATUTES 
Section 58-37-3(1)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 9, 1937, an Information was Issued against the 
defendant, Rick Warenski, charging him with cultivation of 
marijuana in violation of Section 53-37-3(1)(a), Utah Criminal 
Code, as amended. It alleged that on or about September 8, 1987, 
the defendant, Rick Warenski, did knowingly and intentionally 
produce a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana. On September 
3, 1987, Officer Larry Patterson of the Utah County Sheriffs 
Department, a trained pilot, flew an aircraft in the Utah County 
area. He had with him Sergeant Alex Hunt and Sergeant Jens Horn 
of the Utah County Sheriff's Department. (Tr. 168-169). These 
officers were searching for marijuana. In the Salem area of Utah 
County, the officers spotted what they described as approximately 
100 six to eight foot tall marijuana plants. (Tr. 170). No 
persons were spotted on the property by the officers while 
observing from the airplane. Immediately after the alleged 
marijuana was spotted, the officers landed the airplane and 
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Defendant Warenski was placed under arrest and transported 
to the Utah County Jail. Defendant Warenski did not reside at 
the property where the marijuana was growing, the same being 
owned and occupied by co-defendants, Richard Miranda and Terry 
Miranda. Defendant Warenski was and is a resident of the city of 
Pleasant Grove, a city located approximately 20 miles north of 
Salem. (Tr. 268-269). Richard and Terry Miranda, after being 
advised of their Miranda Rights, made statements to officers of 
the Utah County Sheriff's Department and admitted that they had 
cultivated the marijuana, were very proud of it, that it was very 
beautiful and had a value of approximately $200,000.00. (Tr. 244 
-248). Richard and Terry Miranda also explained to officers the 
process employed by them in setting up and caring for the 
marijuana garden. They also explained the expense of so doing. 
(Tr. 262-263, 265). 
Defendant Rick Warenski made no statements to the police and 
was not observed inside the residence of Richard and Terry 
Miranda at any time. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, counsel for the 
defendant Rick Warenski made a motion to dismiss the information 
against Rick Warenski upon the grounds and for the reasons that 
defendant Warenski had been found in a place where marijuana was 
growing, but there was no evidence whatsoever that he was 
cultivating the same or had anything to do with the cultivation 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT WARENSKI'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE'S INFORMATION, WHICH MOTION WAS MADE 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF AND AT THE CON-
CLUSION OF THE TRIAL. 
Section 58-37-3(1)(A)(a)(i) provides as follows: 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally produce, 
manufacture or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance. 
Defendant Warenski was charged with violations of the above 
quoted section of the Utah Controlled Substances Act. The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, has interpreted this statute 
in a number of cases involving facts very similar to if not 
exactly on point with the facts of this case. The first such 
case is that of State v. Schroff, 514 P.2d 795, (Utah 1973). In 
Schroff, one LaVar Brachen discovered that in one of his fields 
someone was cultivating two small patches of plants which he 
suspected were marijuana. The Sheriff of Washington County was 
notified and on the same day the sheriff and Brachen made an 
examination of the areas. The plants were growing on high ground 
and were not watered by irrigation of the other farming areas. 
Depressions had been made adjacent to the plants and the ground 
surrounding the plants was moist. Buckets and jugs were found 
near a creek which was. a short distance from the areas above-
mentioned. Footprints led from the areas to the creek. The 
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areas were placed under surveillance by the sheriff's department. 
On August 2, 1972, the defendant was observed crossing one of the 
fields near the areas where the marijuana was growing. On August 
8, 1972, the defendant was observed picking leaves from one of 
the plants and placing them in a plastic bread wrapper sack. The 
defendant was placed under arrest and charged with the offense of 
cultivation of marijuana in violation of Section 58-37-
8(1 ) (A)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated. While in custody the 
defendant made essentially the following statement to the 
arresting officers: "Why didnft we go catch some of these 
junkies that are peddling dope and leave us with our marijuana 
alone?" The defendant was convicted by jury verdict after trial 
and appealed his conviction claiming that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the charge of cultivation of marijuana. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and stated: 
The evidence taken as a whole would only support a 
charge that the defendant was in possession of 
marijuana. Possession alone is insufficient to show 
that the defendant cultivated or produced the 
substance. We conclude that the defendant's conviction 
must be reversed and it is ordered that the Information 
be dismissed. 
In 1983, the Court decided the case of State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983). In Anderton, Carl L. and Lana G. 
Anderton, husband and wife, were convicted of the offenses of 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute for value and 
production of marijuana. The case was tried to the Court. The 
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facts which were either stipulated or proven were that both of 
the defendants owned and resided in the residence searched by 
officers of the Roosevelt Police Department pursuant to a search 
warrant. The search produced the following: three planters with 
four marijuana plants growing in them; one brown paper bag 
containing two plastic bags each of marijuana; one plastic bag 
containing 7.8 ounces of marijuana^ one plastic bag containing 
4.1 ounces of marijuana; one brown paper bag which contained 
eight smaller plastic bags of marijuana, each of the smaller bags 
being approximately one ounce; one foil wrapped chunk of "hash" 
weighing 10,2 grams; one plastic bag of green plant material; one 
film canister of gveen plant material; two packages of cigarette 
rolling papers* At the time of arrest, Mr. Anderton, stated: 
"My wife doesn't know anything about this. I just came home with 
everything." Evidence at the trial indicated that a confidential 
informant had "personally observed the substance in question." 
The Andertons appealed their convictions and challenged the 
sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the search warrant. 
In addition, Mrs. Anderton, contended that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict her of the crimes charged. On this 
latter issue, the author of the opinion for the Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Hall, concluded: 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the judgment of the trial court as we are obliged to 
do, this writer concludes that it adequately supports 
the conviction of both defendants. The quantity of 
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marijuana and hashish, which included live marijuana 
plants, was too large for personal consumption, and it 
was found in the defendants' home, which they owned and 
resided in as husband and wife. 
It was reasonable for the trial court to infer 
from the attendant facts and circumstances that 
contraband, particularly the potted plants of marijuana 
was in plain view* 
The majority of the court reached a different conclusion and 
reversed the conviction of defendant Lana G. Anderton. 
Supporting its conclusion, the majority stated: 
•..There is no evidence in the record which shows Lana 
Anderton's knowing or intentional involvement in the 
production of marijuana. The only evidence is that of 
joint residence in the home where the plants were 
found. There is nothing to establish how long the 
plants had been there or where they were found • When 
the facts of this case are considered, particularly in 
light of the cases cited above, it requires a "leap of 
faith," to find that Lana Anderton is guilty solely on 
the basis of her marital relationship with her husband 
and their joint occupancy of the home. 
The reasoning of State v. Anderton was followed by the 
Supreme Court in State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1935). In Fox, 
the Weber County Sheriff's Office received an anonymous letter 
stating that seven-foot marijuana plants were growing at 249 
Harris Street in Ogden, Utah. The residence belonged to Gary 
Fox. Acting on the tip, an officer went to the residence to 
investigate. He saw that the yard contained two opaque 
greenhouses, one of which was attached to the house. The officer 
could observe marijuana in the greenhouses and obtained a search 
warrant for the house and greenhouses. The home had two 
bedrooms. One bedroom contained men's clothing, carpentry tools, 
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and a plastic identification card for Clive Fox. The second 
bedroom contained men's clothing, women's underclothing, a 
checkbook and bank deposit slips with Gary Fox's name on them, a 
book entitled "Marijuana Grower's Guide", and marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia. The kitchen contained marijuana and other 
paraphernalia. Both greenhouses contained marijuana plants. One 
of the greenhouses was accessible from the kitchen and had no 
outside entrance. The kitchen and greenhouse were not blocked 
off or separated from the remainder of the house and the entire 
house was very humid. There were items of mail addressed to both 
Gary and Clive found in the house. Gary owned the property. The 
telephone listing was in Clive's name and had been for four 
years. The police did not see either Gary or Clive at the house 
but a neighbor testified that he had seen both of them there. At 
the close of the State's case, both defendant's moved to dismiss 
the charges because of insufficient evidence. The motion was 
denied. Both ^ere convicted of production of a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 
of Gary Fox and reversed the conviction of Clive Fox. Following 
the Anderton reasoning, the Court stated the following: 
Because one of the greenhouses was attached to the 
house and was openly accessible from the kitchen, the 
trier of fact could reasonably find that Clive Fox knew 
that marijuana was being grown in the house. However, 
to prove that he had constructive possession of the 
marijuana, the evidence must also show that he had the 
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power and intent to exercise dominion or control over 
the marijuana. There is no evidence that Clive Fox had 
any intent to grow or to possess the marijuana in the 
greenhouses. While he may have had knowledge of the 
existence of marijuana on the premises, that is not the 
equivalent of constructive possession. 
In the cases just reviewed, the facts showed that all of the 
defendants were in close proximity to and had a knowledge of the 
presence of marijuana or other contraband substances. In two of 
the cases, the defendants resided in the location where the 
marijuana or contraband substances were found. In this case, 
defendant Warenski was found present where marijuana was growing 
but the defendant resided 20 miles away from the property where 
the marijuana was growing. Apparently the defendant had only 
been in the area where the marijuana was growing for a few 
minutes before confronted by the deputies of the Utah County 
Sheriff's Department. No other evidence suggested that defendant 
Warenski had any other connection or tie with the property. On 
the other hand the facts clearly show that the property was owned 
and resided in by Richard and Terri Miranda. Several marijuana 
plants were found in a harvested condition inside the home along 
with other paraphernalia and books giving instructions on how to 
grow marijuana. Further, the evidence clearly shows that both 
Terri and Richard Miranda acknowledged that they were growing the 
marijuana, were proud of the marijuana, knew the value of the 
marijuana and the investment into the production of the 
marijuana. The Mirandas did not implicate defendant Warenski in 
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the cultivation or production of marijuana. The mere fact that 
defendant Warenski was standing with his back to the officer as 
he entered into the area where the marijuana was growing and that 
he was facing a shower stall containing water in the tub portion 
of it and doing something which the officer could not determine, 
is not sufficient evidence to form a nexus between defendant 
Warenski and the marijuana to suggest or cause a conclusion that 
he was producing or participating in the production of marijuana. 
At the very most, defendant Warenski knew that marijuana was 
growing here. Based upon the facts of this case, and the rulings 
of the Supreme Court in the cases heretofore cited, defendant 
Warenski, contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss and that the case should be reversed and the 
information should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY. 
The arguments supporting this point are the same as or 
closely related to those which have been made by defendant In 
support of his argument under Point I. In the interest of 
brevity and to avoid cumulative argument, counsel and defendant 
simply elect to support Point II by referring the Court to the 
arguments made in the cases reviewed under Point I. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to 
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dismiss the information against him both at the time when the 
motion was made at the conclusion of the prosecution's case and 
at the time when the motion was made at the conclusion of the 
trial. Defendant at most knew that marijuana was growing. No 
evidence was presented by the prosecution which demonstrated that 
a sufficient nexus existed between the defendant and the 
contraband to permit an inference that the defendant knew of its 
existence and had both the power and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over and was responsible for the controlled 
substance in production. The evidence was wholly insufficient to 
support a conviction by the jury of the defendant Rick Warenski. 
Based upon this Court's decisions in the wSchroff, Anderton, 
and Fox cases, the defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse his conviction and to order a dismissal of the 
Information against him. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^^—- day of July, 1938. 
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ADDENDUM 
STEVEN B. KIULPACK 
Utah County Attorney 
37 East Center, Suite 200 
Prow, Utah 84601 
gpawTSH FORK DEPARTMENT. EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT. 
UTAH COUNTY. FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT. STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Criminal No. 
RICHARD MERANDA, TERRI MERANDA, 
and RICK WARENSKI 
Defendants). 
DOB: 12-27-57 
DOB: . 6 -15-61 _ _ _ ^ ^ _ _ _ 
DOTH—H-4-b4 " 
STEVEN B. KII1PACK, Utah County Attorney. State of Utah, accuses the defendant® of the following 
crimes): 
CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA, a felony of the third degree, in 
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that they, on or about 8 September 1987, in Utah 
County, STate of Utah, did knowingly and intentionally produce 
a controlled substance, to-wit: Marijuana. 
This Information is based on evidence sworn to by: A l e x H u n t , UCSO 
Authorized for prosecution by. : / 
UTAH COdftfY ATTORNEY ' 
Ikf WM^ 
asm 
COMPLAINANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me _ 
day of Si 19 * < • 
DEPUTY J 
Estimated time for preliminary hearing: 
1258 Utah « » PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
theory is applicable in this context only to 
suits for infringement of patent that pre-
supposes ownership.14 Defendant has no 
ownership rights in the patent and a suit to 
establish those rights would be governed by 
the three-year statute of limitations, which 
began to run at the time the patent was 
issued. 
Since defendant's action is barred by the 
statute of limitations, we have no need to 
reach the merits of the question as to 
whether plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser 
for value. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., and J. DUF-
FY PALMER, District Judge, concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
HOWE, J., having disqualified himself, 
does not participate herein; J. DUFFY 
PALMER, District Judge, sat. 
(O IttYIM RCYNUMCtSrSHM) 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Carl L. and Lana G. ANDERTON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 18506. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 15, 1983. 
Defendants were convicted in the 
Fourth District Court, Duchesne County, 
David Sam, J., of possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute for value and pro-
duction of marijuana, and they appealed. 
The Supreme Court, in opinions by Hall, 
14. M. & T. Chemicals, Inc. v. International 
Business Machines Corp., 403 F.Supp. 1145 
CJ., and Durham, J., held that: (1) affida-
vit in support of warrant for search of 
house was not insufficient even though it 
did not set forth time and place of infor-
mant's observations or by whom marijuana 
was possessed where affidavit set forth suf-
ficient underlying circumstances to support 
conclusions reached by affiant and to sup-
port reliability and credibility of informant, 
and (2) evidence was insufficient to support 
conviction of defendant's wife where con-
viction was based solely on her joint owner-
ship of and residence in home where drugs 
were found. 
Defendant's conviction affirmed; de-
fendant's wife's conviction reversed. 
Durham, J., filed opinion concurring 
separately in result in which Stewart and 
Howe, JJ,, concurred. 
1. Drugs and Narcotics *=»188 
Affidavit in support of warrant for 
search of defendant's house for marijuana 
was not insufficient even though it failed to 
set forth time and place of informant's ob-
servation or by whom marijuana was pq**( 
sessed where sufficient underlying circum-
stances were set forth to support conclu-
sions reached by affiant and to support' 
reliability and credibility of informant in 
that affidavit recited that informant per-
sonally observed the marijuana and was 
couched in present-tense language describ* 
ing ongoing criminal activity. 
1 Searches and Seizures *=»3.4 
Blank portions of affidavit in support 
of search warrant would be disregarded de^ 
spite defendants' contention that blank por^ 
tions rendered affidavit void in light qt, 
statute providing that every paper made qr 
issued by a justice must be issued without a 
blank to be filled in by another where the** 
was no contention on the part of defendants 
that blanks complained of in any way i&\ 
fringed upon their substantial right*? 
Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 30; U.C.A.1953, 77-
23-9, 78^5-24; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend: 4 
(S.D.N.Y.1975), affd, 542 F.2d 1165 (2nd Or. 
1976). 
STATE v. 
Clte««8P.2d 
3. Searches and Seizures «»&8(1) 
Magistrate's failure to comply with 
statute requiring return of search warrant 
and related documents to appropriate court 
within 15 days after return on execution of 
the warrant constituted nothing more than 
failure to perform ministerial act which did 
not affect validity of search warrant or 
search conducted thereunder in absence of 
any showing that failure to comply with 
statute had any adverse affect upon de-
fendants' substantial rights. U.CA.1953, 
77-2S--0. 
4. Criminal Law *=»1159.2(7) 
Accepted standard of appellate review 
permits Supreme Court to overturn convic-
tion only when it is made to appear that 
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain 
reasonable doubt of guilt, and Supreme 
Court should only interfere when evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial that reasona-
ble men could not possibly have determined 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
5. Drugs and Narcotics *»U8 
Evidence was insufficient to support 
conviction of defendant for possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute for val-
ue and production of marijuana where con-
viction was based solely on her joint owner-
ship of and residence in home where mari-
juana was found. U.CA.1958, 58-37-S. 
Robert M. McRae, Vernal, for defendants 
and appellants. 
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendants were convicted of the of-
fenses of possession of marijuana with in-
tent to distribute for value and production 
of marijuana.1 On appeal, they challenge 
the propriety of the search of their resi-
dence, and defendant Lana G. Anderton 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support her conviction. 
The case was tried to the court, sitting 
without a jury, on partially stipulated facts 
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abstracted as follows: Defendants owned 
and resided in the residence searched by 
officers of the Roosevelt Police Department 
pursuant to a search warrant The search 
produced the following: 
a. Three (3) planters with four (4) 
green plants growing in them. 
b. One (1) brown paper bag contain-
ing two (2) plastic bags each, [sic] of 
which contained green plant material. 
One (1) plastic bag containing 7.8 ounces 
of material and one (1) containing 4.1 
ounces of material [sic]. 
c. One (1) brown paper bag which 
contained a large plastic bag which in 
turn contained eight (8) smaller plastic 
bags of green plant material. Each of 
the smaller bags contained approximately 
one (1) oujice of material. The large 
plastic bag also contained one (1), [sic] 
foil-wrapped, [sic] chunk of "hash" which 
weighted [sic] 10.2 grams. 
d. One (1) plastic bag of green plant 
material. 
e. One (1) film canister of green plant 
material. 
f. Two (2) packages of cigarette roll-
ing papers. 
It was further stipulated that the plants 
and the green plant material were in fact 
marijuana, and in reference to the bags of 
marijuana defendant Carl L. Anderton stat-
ed, "My wife doesn't know anything about 
this. I just came home with everything." 
The evidence at trial was that the subject 
search warrant was issued by a justice of 
the peace, John B Gale, upon the affidavit 
of Officer Jeff Stagg of the Roosevelt Po-
lice Department that a confidential infor-
mant had related to him that he had "per-
sonally observed the substance in question." 
It was also recited in the affidavit that 
Officer Stagg had conferred extensively 
with the informant who had previously co-
operated with him, "providing truthful, co-
gent information, resultant in bodily injury 
to CI." Portions of the preprinted form 
affidavit allowing for insertion of the date 
of the informant's observation and the date 
1. In violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37^8. 
1260 Utah 668 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
the information was given to the affiant 
were left blank. 
The affidavit further recited that the 
marijuana was located at defendants' resi-
dence, which was identified by street ad-
dress, and in a pickup truck identified by 
make, model, color and license number. 
For the stated purpose of a nighttime 
search, the affiant recited that he was posi-
tive of the location of the marijuana be-
cause "I have conferred extensively with an 
informant of a confidential nature, who has 
related to me the information contained 
herein." 
The search warrant was issued at 9:42 
p.m. on May 3, 1981, and the search was 
conducted that same night The search 
warrant, the supporting affidavit and the 
officer's return of the property seized was 
retained by Judge Gale until August 27, 
1981, when they were turned over to Offi-
cer Wayne Embleton for use at the prelimi-
nary hearing conducted by the circuit court 
Thereafter, Officer Embleton kept the doc-
uments in his possession until the trial, at 
which time he testified that they had not 
been altered. 
Defendants first contend that the evi-
dence should have been suppressed because 
the affidavit in support of the warrant 
failed to state probable cause for the search 
in that it did not meet the two-pronged test 
advanced in Aguilar v. Texas} followed in 
Spineili v. United States} which requires 1) 
that "underlying circumstances" be set 
forth sufficient for the magistrate to inde-
pendently judge the validity of the infor-
mant's conclusion, and 2) that the affiant 
support his claim that the informant was 
"credible" and his information was "relia-
ble." 
[1] Defendants urge that the affidavit 
does not meet the Aguilar teat because it 
2. 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 LEd.2d 723 
(1964). 
3. 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 LEd.2d 637 
(1969). 
4. Citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 
13 LEd.2d 142 (1964). 
does not set forth the time and place, nor 
by whom the marijuana was possessed. 
Furthermore, since authority was sought to 
search a vehicle in addition to the residence, 
the location of the marijuana was unknown 
to affiant 
As was observed in Spineili regarding the 
notion of probable cause: 
[Pjrobability, and not a prima facie show-
ing, of criminal activity is the standard of 
probable cause4 . . . [l]n judging proba-
ble cause issuing magistrates are not to 
be confined by niggardly limitations or by 
restrictions on the use of their common 
sense,1 and that their determination of 
probable cause should be paid great def-
erence by reviewing courts.* 
398 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct 584, 590, 21 
LEd.2d 637. 
Applying the foregoing standards in the 
instant case, the affidavit contains ade-
quate facts to support the magistrate's 
finding of probable cause to issue the war-
rant Read as a whole, and in a common-
sense way,? the affidavit sets forth suffi-
cient underlying circumstances to support 
the conclusions reached by the affiant and 
to support the reliability and credibility of 
the informant 
Unlike Aguilar, the affidavit in this case 
recites that the informant personally ob-
served the marijuana. Also, the affiant's 
conclusion that a search of the residence 
and vehicle would produce the contraband 
was supported by the further recitals that 
the informant "has related to me the infor-
mation contained herein," verified by the 
affiant's own investigation that "the indi-
vidual named herein sells contraband in 
quantity." 
It is also to be observed that during the 
pendency of this appeal, in the case of ////-
5. Citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 
102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 LEd.2d 684 (1965). 
6. Citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 
80 S.Ct. 725. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); see also 
State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715 (1983). 
7. United States v. Ventresca, supra n. 5. 
STATE v. 
Cite as SSSPJd 
/20/5 v. Gates,1 the United States Supreme 
Court abandoned the rigid "two-pronged 
test" advanced in Aguilar and Spinelli in 
favor of reaffirming the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances analysis that traditionally has 
informed probable cause determinations. 
In so doing, the Court had this to say: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is sim-
ply to make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circum-
stances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the "veracity" and "basis 
of knowledge" of persons supplying hear-
say information, there is a fair probabili-
ty that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place. And 
the duty of a reviewing court is simply to 
ensure that the magistrate had a "sub-
stantial basis for . . . concluding]" that 
probable cause existed. Jones v. United 
States, supra, 362 U.S., at 271 [80 S.Ct at 
736]. We are convinced that this flexible, 
easily applied standard will better 
achieve the accommodation of public and 
private interests that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires than does the approach 
that has developed from Aguilar and Spi-
nelll 
— US. at , 103 S.Ct. 
2317, at 2332, 76 LEd.2d 527. 
The "totality of the circumstances test" 
as reaffirmed in Gates lends even further 
support for the conclusion reached by the 
magistrate in the instant case that probable 
cause existed for the issuance of the search 
warrant 
Defendants also rely upon Rosencranz v 
United States,9 which interpreted United 
States v. Ventrescalf as requiring the affi-
davit to specifically set forth the time of 
the informant's observations. We do not so 
interpret Ventresca. 
8. — U S 
(1983) 
-, 103 S Ct 2317, 76 L.Ed 2d 527 
9. 356 F2d 310 (1st Clr 1966). 
10. Supra n 5 
11. Citing Jones v United States, 362 U S at 
270, 80 S Ct at 735 In accord State v Rome-
ro, supra n 6 
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The standard established in Ventresca is 
that of commonsense, which was stated 
therein as follows: 
[Affidavits for search warrants, such as 
the one involved here, must be tested and 
interpreted by magistrates and courts in 
a commonsense and realistic fashion. 
380 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct at 745. 
[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal 
cases in this area should be largely deter-
mined by the preference to be accorded 
warrants.11 
The affidavit in the instant case, couched 
as it is in present-tense language which 
describes on-going criminal activity, clearly 
refutes any contention that it was based 
upon stale information.11 Further applying 
the commonsense rule espoused in Ventres-
ca, the affidavit on its face presented a 
substantial basis for the magistrate to con-
clude: 1) that the information received by 
the affiant was recent and contemporane-
ous; 2) that contraband was probably pos-
sessed by defendant Carl Anderton; and 8) 
that realistically the search should include 
not only the residence, but the vehicle as 
well. 
[2] Defendants next contend that the 
blank portions of the affidavit rendered it 
void in light of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-6-24, 
which provides: 
Every paper made or issued by a jus-
tice, except a subpoena, must be issued 
without a blank to be filled in by another; 
otherwise it is void. 
There is some considerable question 
whether the foregoing statute applies to the 
affidavit in question since it would appear 
that it is not "a paper made or issued by a 
justice" containing blanks "to be filled in by 
another." However, we do not address that 
issue, for in the absence of any contention 
12. In accord State v day, 7 WashApp 631, 
501 P 2d 603 (1972), Guzewicz v Siayton, 366 
FSupp 1402 (EDVal973)f Covington v 
State, 129 Ga App 150, 199 S E.2d 346 (1973), 
State v Boudreawc, La, 304 So 2d 343 (1974) 
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on the part of defendants that the blanks 
complained of in any way infringed upon 
their substantial rights, the Court is obliged 
to disregard the "defect" in the affidavit by 
reason of the content of Rule 30, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which pro-
vides as follows: 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of a party shall be disre-
garded. [Emphasis added.] 
[3] Defendants also contend that the 
magistrate's failure to return the search 
warrant and the related documents to the 
appropriate court within fifteen days after 
the return on execution of the warrant in 
compliance with U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23-9 
rendered the documents void. Again, how-
ever, defendants have made no showing 
that the magistrate's failure to comply with 
the statute had any adverse effect upon 
their substantial rights, nor have they 
shown that such failure in any way compro-
mised the integrity of the documents. We 
therefore conclude that the violation of the 
statute constituted nothing more than the 
failure to perform a ministerial act which 
did not affect the validity of the search 
warrant and the search conducted thereun-
der." 
The remaining contention on appeal is 
that of defendant Lana Anderton that the 
evidence was insufficient to convict her of 
the crimes charged. The State's rejoinder 
is that not only was the evidence at trial 
sufficient to convict, but there was an ab-
sence of substantial or believable evidence 
necessary to generate reasonable doubt of 
guilt 
13. State v. Romero, supra n. 6; see also Wright 
v. SUte, Okl.Cr., 552 P.2d 1157 (1976); People 
v. Wilson, 173 Cola 536, 482 P26 355 (1971); 
United States v. Wilson, 451 F.2d 209 (5th 
Cir.1971). 
14. SUte v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977). 
15. SUte v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980). 
16. SUte v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P2d 1161 
(1980). 
17. Nevcrtheleis, t majority of the Court con-
cludes to the contrary and opines that the evi-
[4] The accepted standard of appellate 
review permits this Court to overturn a 
conviction only when it is made to appear 
that reasonable minds must necessarily en-
tertain a reasonable doubt of guilt,14 and we 
should only interfere when the evidence is 
so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable 
men could not possibly have determined 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt11 
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the judgment of the trial court 
as we are obliged to do,11 this writer con-
cludes that it adequately supports the con-
viction of both defendants. The quantity 
of marijuana and hashish, which included 
live marijuana plants, was too large for 
personal consumption, and it was found in 
the defendants' home, which they owned 
and resided in as husband and wife. 
It was reasonable for the trial court to 
infer from the attendant facts and circum-
stances that the contraband, particularly 
the potted plants of marijuana, was in plain 
view. It was also reasonable to infer from 
the stipulation of the parties that both de-
fendants were present during the search, at 
which time defendant Carl L. Anderton vol-
unteered that "my wife doesn't know any-
thing about this. I just came home with 
everything." Furthermore, in their brief 
on appeal, defendants concede that they 
were both present during the search.17 
The fact that defendant Lana Anderton 
was not named in the search warrant is of 
no moment, because the resultant search 
and the stipulation of facts placed her in 
constructive, if not actual, possession of a 
large quantity of contraband which was 
obviously intended for distribution. 
dence of constructive possession was insuffi-
cient to support the conviction of defendant 
Lana G. Anderton. However, viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the judg-
ment of the trial court, it supports the conclu-
sion that the contraband was found in the pres-
ence of both defendants, in open view and 
readily accessible to each, all of which meets 
the standards of constructive possession laid 
down in the case of United States v. Davis, 562 
F.2d 681 (D.C.Cir.1977), and others relied upon 
by the majority. 
STATE v, 
CJt«M«68P.2d 
The only exculpatory evidence presented 
to the trial court was defendant Carl An-
derton's assertion that "my wife doesn't 
know anything about this. I just came 
home with everything." The trial court 
apparently discounted the statement as be-
ing only an act of chivalry made in an 
effort to exonerate his wife. 
[S] It lies within the prerogative of the 
trial court to weigh the evidence and deter-
mine the credibility of the .witnesses, and 
this Court should not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the trial court on issues of 
fact that are supported by substantial, cred-
ible and admissible evidence.16 Neverthe-
less, a majority of the Court has concluded 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
the conviction of the defendant Lana G. 
Anderton, and her conviction is therefore 
reversed. 
The conviction and judgment of the trial 
court as to the defendant Carl L. Anderton 
are affirmed in all respects. 
OAKS, J., concurs. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring separately 
in result): 
[4,5] I concur with the opinion of the 
Chief Justice in affirming Carl Anderton's 
conviction of the crimes of production of 
marijuana and possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute for value. See, U.C.A., 
1953, §§ 58-37-«(aXi) & (ii) (Supp.1981). 
However, I believe that there is insufficient 
evidence to convict his wife Lana Anderton. 
The standard of review, as cited by the 
Chief Justice's opinion, authorizes this 
Court to overturn a conviction when the 
evidence is so lacking or inconclusive that 
reasonable minds must entertain a doubt of 
guilt The evidence in this case is so inade-
quate as to compel such reasonable doubt of 
guilt in the case of Mrs. Anderton. 
The issue here is whether the facts in the 
record are sufficient to establish Mrs. An-
18. SUte v. Lamm, supm n. 15. 
1. This case involved a husband and wife who, 
following a warrant search of their home, were 
charged with possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute. Police officers 
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derton's guilt for offenses which require 
both knowledge and intent. See, U.C.A., 
1953, § 58-37-«(a) (Supp.1981). Of the two 
elements of possession with intent to dis-
tribute, possession must first be shown. 
While this Court has stated that "[unlaw-
ful possession does not necessarily mean 
that the substance be found on the person 
of the accused or that he have sole and 
exclusive possession thereof," to prove con-
structive possession, the evidence must 
show that the drugs were "subject to [the 
accused's] dominion and control." State v. 
Carlson, Utah, 685 ?M 72, 74 (1981) (foot-
notes omitted).1 Lana Anderton's convic-
tion on this charge was based solely on her 
joint ownership of and residence in the 
home where the drugs were found. There 
is substantial support for the rule that 
where a defendant is in nonexclusive pos-
session or occupancy of the premises on 
which controlled substances are found, 
there must be some additional incriminating 
evidence to establish guilt of possession: 
[P]roof of a proprietary interest in or 
regular occupancy of the premises alone 
is not sufficient to prove constructive pos-
session. 
United States v. Davis, 562 P^d 681, 693 
(D.C.Cir.1977). (emphasis in original). The 
Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that: 
There is no presumption of knowing or 
intentional possession of the marijuana 
from [defendant's] occupancy of the resi-
dence. Her occupancy of the premises as 
a cotenantf however, is a factor to be 
considered with other evidence in deter-
mining whether she had constructive pos-
session. 
Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 447, 281 
S.E.2d 858, 855 (1981) (citations omitted). 
See also United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 
1012,1016-18 (D.C.Cir.1982), Evans v. Unit-
ed States, 257 F2d 121 (9th Cir.1958). One 
searched the bedroom and found guns, drugs 
and paraphernalia, including sealing agent, 
plasUc bags, measuring spoons, a funnel, a 
strainer and scales. The charges against the 
wife were dismissed. 
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summary of the general rule reads as fol-
lows: 
[W]here the defendant is in nonexclusive 
possession of premises on which illicit 
drugs are found, it cannot be inferred 
that he knew of the presence of such 
drugs and had control of them, unless 
there are other incriminating statements 
or circumstances tending to buttress such 
an inference. 
Annot, 56 AX.RA1 948, 957 (1974 & Supp. 
1982). 
In light of the requirement of other in-
criminating circumstances in addition to 
mere occupancy, the facts of each case are 
critical and must be presented in detail. 
Some of the key factual determinations 
which have supported findings of construc-
tive possession in other cases are: 1) the 
defendant's presence at the time the drugs 
were found, with emphasis on the fact that 
the drugs were in plain or open view, see 
United States v. Lawson, supra; United 
States v. Davis, supra; Ford v. State, 37 
Md.App. 378, 377 AJM 577 (1977); Eckhart 
v. Commonwealth, supra; 2) the defend-
ant's access to the drugs, see United States 
v. Davis, supra; State v. Brown, 80 NJ. 
587, 404 A.2d 1111, 1115 (1979); 3) the 
proximity of defendant to the drugs, see 
Ford v. State, supra, although "[m]ere prox-
imity to the controlled substance . . . is 
insufficient to establish possession." Eck-
hart v. Commonwealth, supra, at 450, 281 
S.E.2d at 855; see also Wright v. Common-
wealth, 217 Va. 669, 232 S.K2d 733 (1977) 
(where the defendant, although not residing 
in the apartment, was found sitting in a 
bedroom next to a friend who was injecting 
himself with heroin, and substantial quanti-
ties of heroin were found three feet from 
the defendant; the defendant was acquit-
ted despite evidence of history of heroin 
use); 4) evidence indicating that the "de-
2. Other evidentiary factors which have been 
recognized by courts in determining guilt of 
possession in nonexclusive occupancy cases in-
clude suspicious behavior, previous sale of 
drugs and drug use. See Annot., supra.* 
3. There was no evidence offered by the State 
on this issue except for a brief written stipula-
tion of fact. 
fendant was participating with others in 
the mutual use and enjoyment of the con-
traband"; Ford v. State, supra, at 382, 377 
A.2d at 581-82 (quoting Folk v. State, 11 
Md.App. 508, 514-18, 275 K2A 184, 187-89 
(1971)); and 5) incriminating statements, 
Evans v. United States, supra? 
Thus, it is clear that, in finding construc-
tive possession of controlled substances in 
nonexclusive occupancy settings, courts 
have relied on extensive and detailed factu-
al evidence. In contrast, the facts as stipu-
lated in this case' consist of a confirmation 
that the defendants owned and resided in 
the house where the warrant search was 
made, a list of the items found in that 
search, most of which were enclosed in two 
brown paper bags, and the statement made 
by defendant Carl Anderton that his wife 
knew nothing about the drugs and that he 
had just returned home with them. The 
only other relevant evidence in the record 
consists of testimony regarding the 
amounts of marijuana and hashish general-
ly kept by an individual for personal use.4 
There is no evidence as to where in the 
home the drugs were found or where the 
defendant Lana Anderton was when the 
officers entered the house. Moreover, there 
is no evidence of any incriminating conduct 
or statements of Lana Anderton. Thus, 
there is nothing which establishes that the 
drugs were in her view, accessible or even 
close to her, or that she was participating in 
the use of the drugs or knew of their pres-
ence in the house. 
Similarly, there is no evidence in the rec-
ord which shows Lana Anderton's knowing 
or intentional involvement in the produc-
tion of marijuana. The only evidence is 
that of joint residence in the home where 
the plants were found; there is nothing to 
4. That testimony related to use amounts for an 
individual. Presumably those amounts should 
have been doubled to determine the amounts 
for the personal consumption of both defend-
ants. 
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establish how long the plants had been about his wife's guilt Lana Anderton's 
there or where they were found. conviction should therefore be reversed. 
When the facts of this case are con-
sidered, particularly in light of the cases STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur in the 
cited above, it requires a "leap of faith" to concurring opinion of DURHAM, J. 
find that Lana Anderton is guilty solely on 
the basis of her marital relationship with 
her husband and their joint occupancy of 
the home. In view of the lack of other 
evidence, the self-inculpatory statement 
made by Carl Anderton that he had "just 
brought the drugs home" compels doubt 
8 20 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting) 
I do not share the reasoning of the Court 
in overturning State v Brady l 
While the Utah Constitution affords the 
right of appeal in all cases,2 that right may 
be effectively waived or abandoned One who 
escapes not only abandons his appeal, he also 
abandons and forsakes the judicial system as 
a whole He no longer relies upon it in any 
respect, and to dismiss his appeal for that 
reason is neither to be viewed as a forfeiture 
of a constitutional right nor as a penalty 
This is particularly demonstrated by the facts 
of the instant case wherein Tuttle did not 
voluntarily return to custody with any excuse 
or justification for his behavior, but in fact 
remained at large for a considerable length of 
time. Had he not been tracked down, 
arrested, and involuntarily returned to 
custody, he no doubt would have remained at 
large Only because of his reincarceration 
does he again seek relief from the system 
1 would not disturb the prior dismissal of 
the appeal 
Howe, Justice, concurs in the dissen-
ting opinion of Chief Justice Hall 
1. Utah, 655 P.2d 1132(1982) 
2. Art. I, §12. 
Cue as 
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STEWART, Justice: 
Defendants Gary and Give Fox were 
convicted of possession with intent to distri-
bute and production of a controlled 
substance in violation of U C A , 1953, §58 
37-8(l)(a)(i) and §57 37 8(l)(a)(n) On 
appeal, both defendants argue that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain the charges 
We affirm the conviction of Gary Fox and 
reverse the conviction of Give Fox 
In June 1983, the Weber County Sheriffs 
Office received an anonymous letter stating 
that 7-foot marijuana plants growing at 249 
Harris Street in Ogden were soon to be harv-
ested The residence belonged to Gary Fox 
Acting on the tip, an officer went to the 
residence to investigate He saw that the yard 
contained two opaque greenhouses, one of 
which was attached to the house The officer 
was able to determine that one greenhouse 
contained marijuana because a marijuana 
leaf was pressed against the greenhouse That 
same day, the officer obtained a search 
warrant for the house and the greenhouses 
and conducted a search while the premises 
were unoccupied 
The home had two bedrooms One 
bedroom contained men's clothing, carpentry 
tools, and a plastic identification card for 
Give which had expired April 15, 1982 The 
second bedroom contained men's clothing, 
women's underclothing, a checkbook and 
bank deposit slips with Gary's name on them, 
a book entitled Marijuana Grower's Guide, 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia The 
kitchen contained marijuana and other para-
phernalia Both greenhouses contained 
marijuana plants One of the greenhouses 
was accessible from the kitchen and had no 
outside entrance The kitchen and greenhouse 
were not separated or blocked off from the 
remainder of the house, and the entire house 
was very humid In searching the house the 
officers found mail addressed to both Gary 
and Give 
Gary owned the property He arranged for 
the delivery of gas to the house, and the gas 
bills were sent to him The telephone listing, 
however, was in Give's name, and had been 
since 1979 
Neither Gary nor Give had been seen near 
the house by the police Mr Seamon, a 
neighbor, testified that he thought Gary and 
Give lived at the house "I would see them 
on weekends would be all," doing yard work 
Mrs Seamon testified in response to a 
question whether she knew who lived at 249 
Harris 'Well, I had seen Give and Gary Fox 
over there ' Neither witness remembered 
seeing either Gary or Give at the house on 
any specific occasion during the month 
For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, sec the second section of this issue 
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preceding the arrest, but remembered they 
were absent for a period following the arrest. 
An officer testified that the house appeared 
to be occupied because the refrigerator and 
cupboards contained food, and the kitchen 
had both clean and dirty dishes in it. 
At the close of the State's case, both Gary 
and Clive moved to dismiss the charges 
because of insufficient evidence. The motion 
was denied. The trial court stated that the 
defendants lived in or occupied the home, 
and that there was "enough marijuana 
growth for sale." 
Both were convicted of production of a 
controlled substance and possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute for 
value in violation of U.C.A., 1953, §58-37-
8(lKa)(i) and §58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). On appeal, 
the defendants renew their claim that there 
was insufficient evidence to prove that they 
grew marijuana and that the marijuana found 
in the residence belonged to them or was for 
distribution. 
This Court may overturn a conviction for 
insufficient evidence when it is apparent that 
the evidence is insufficient to prove each 
clement of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.. State v. Pctree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 
444(1983). 
A conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute requires 
proof of two elements: (1) that defendant 
knowingly and intentionally possessed "a con-
trolled substance* and (2) that defendant 
intended to distribute the controlled 
substance to anpjher^y.C.A., 1953, §58-37-
8(lXa)(ii). Actual physical possession presup-
poses knowing and intentional possession. 
However, actual physical possession is not 
necessary to convict a defendant of posses-
sion of a controlled substance. State v. Carls-
on, Utah, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (1981). A convic-
tion may also be based on constructive posse-
ssion. Id. In Carlson, we held that construc-
tive possession exists "where the contraband 
is subject to [defendant's] dominion and 
control." Id. However, per sons who might 
know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and 
who might even have access to them, but who 
have no intent to obtain and use the drugs 
can not be convicted of possession of a cont-
rolled substance. Knowledge and ability to 
possess do not equal possession where there is 
nj2_eyjdtacfi^ i>£ intent .Jo make use of that 
knowledge and ability. 
To find that a defendant had constructive 
possession of a drug or other contraband, it 
is necessary to prove that there was a suffic-
ient nexus between the accused and the drug 
to permit an inference that the accused had 
both the power and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the drug. See 
United States v. Cardenas, 748 F.2d 1015, 
1019-20 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 
694 (1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in part 
concurring in part). 
Whether a sufficient nexus between the 
accused and the drug exists depends upon the 
facts and circumstances of each case. State v. 
Anderton, Utah, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1983). 
Ownership.. and/or^accupancy of the premises 
upon which the drugs are found, although 
important factors,, are not alone sufficient to 
establish . constructive possession, especially 
wb£fl._££Ciipancy is not exclusive. United 
States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). Some other factors which might 
combine to show a sufficient nexus between 
the accused and the drug are: incriminating 
statements made by the accused, Allen v. St-
ate, 158 Ga. App. 691, 282 S.E.2d 126, 127 
(1981) (defendant told unnamed individual 
that defendant had $500 worth of marijua-
na); incriminating behavior of the accused, 
United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 
1981) (defendant nodded affirmatively when 
introduced as owner of cocaine, and 
remained with drug during negotiations); 
Francis v. State, Ala. App., 410 So.2d 469 
(1982) (defendant slammed door in face of 
police and ran back into the house yelling, 
"throw it in the fire"); presence of drugs in a 
specific area over which the accused had 
control, such as a closet or drawer containing 
the accused's clothing or other personal 
effects, Walker v. United States, 489 F.2d 
714, 715 (8th Cir.) (drugs found in closet co-
ntaining defendant's clothing), cert, denied, 
416 U.S. 990 (1974); presence of drug parap-
hernalia among the accused's personal effects 
or in a place over which the accused has 
special control, United States v, James, 494 
F.2d 1007, 1030-31 D.C. Cir.) (drug paraph-
ernalia found in a locked box in defendant's 
dresser), cert, denied sub nom., Jackson v. 
United States, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); Petley v. 
United States, 427 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Or.) 
(pipe containing marijuana residue found in 
defendant's duffel bag), cert, denied, 400 
U.S. 827 (1970). In every case, the determin-
ation that someone has constructive posses-
sion of drugs is a factual determination which 
turns on the particular circumstances of the 
case. Among these circumstances must be 
facts which permit the inference that the 
accused intended to use the drugs as his or 
her own. A conviction for production of a 
controlled substance requires evidence that 
the accused knowingly and intentionally 
produced the controlled substance. U.C.A., 
1953, §58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (supp. 1983); see 
State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 709, 
712 (1980); and evidence of possession may 
be part of. a circumstantial link in the 
necessary chain of evidence. 
The evidence as to Gary sufficiently 
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supports his convictions for production of a 
controlled substance and possession of 
marijuana with an intent to distribute. Gary 
owned the property where the marijuana was 
found. Although he may not have had 
exclusive control or possession (in a practical 
non-legal sense) of the premises, his non-
exclusive possession and control combined 
with other incriminating evidence to provide 
an adequate foundation for the convictions. 
State v. Andcrton, Utah, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 
(1983). Gary owned the house. His occupancy 
and control was evidenced by the presence of 
his personal effects in the same room as mar-
ijuana, drug-related paraphernalia, and a 
book entitled Marijuana Grower's Guide. 
Another room also contained marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia. Because he was the 
owner and occupier of the property and 
because of the manner in which the greenho-
uses were constructed in proximity to the 
house, one being accessible only through the 
house, there is a reasonable inference that he 
not only knew of the greenhouses and their 
contents but also had the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the 
marijuana located in them, and was respons-
ible for growing the marijuana. Furthermore, 
there was sufficient evidence that he intended 
to distribute the marijuana. Where one 
possesses a controlled substance in a quantity 
too large for personal consumption, the trier 
of fact can infer that the possessor had an 
intent to distribute. State v. Anderton, Utah, 
668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1983). The police found 
approximately 2,850 mature marijuana plants 
growing on Gary's property, an amount of 
marijuana unquestionably too large for 
personal use. 
On these facts the evidence was sufficient 
to sustain the conviction of Gary Fox of pos-
session of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute, and production of a controlled 
substance. 
Because Qne of the greenhouses^ was 
attached tq the house and was openly access-
ible from, the kitchen,, the trier of fact could 
reasonably find that Clive Fox knew thai 
marijuana was being grown in the house. 
However, • to prove that he had constructive 
possession of the marijuana, the evidence 
must also show that he had the power and 
intent to exercise dominion or control over 
the marijuana. There is no evidence that 
Clive Fox had any intent to grow or to 
possess the marijuana in the greenhouses. 
While he may have had knowledge of the 
existence of marijuana on the premises, that 
is not the equivalent of constructive possess-
ion. Indeed, evidence supporting the theory 
of "constructive possession" must raise a rea-
sonable inference that the defendant was 
engaged in a criminal enterprise and not 
simply a bystander. That is, the evidence in 
its totality must show that defendant's 
dominion or control over the area must have 
been such that he in fact intended to exercise 
dominion and control over the marijuana 
The evidence showed that the telephone at 
246 Harris Street was in Clive's name, that he 
was seen there on an undated occasion doing 
yard work, that mail addressed to him was 
found at unspecified locations within the 
house, and that his expired identification card 
was found in the room that apparently was 
his sleeping quarters, which contained no 
marijuana or related paraphernalia. On the 
totality of the evidence, a reasonable person 
could not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Clive had even non-exclusive dominion 
or control over the area where the marijuana 
was found. There was not any evidence at all 
beyond the possibility that Clive sometimes 
occupied the premises to link Clive Fox to the 
marijuana. In addition, there is no evidence 
that Clive grew the marijuana plants or parti-
cipated in producing or distributing the mari-
juana. 
The conviction of Gary Fox is affirmed. 
The conviction of Clive Fox is reversed, and 
that case is remanded for the purpose of dis-
charging him. 
WE CONCUR: 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Concurring and Diss-
enting) 
I do not join the Court in overturning the 
convictions of defendant Clive Fox because I 
am not persuaded that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
This Court's standard of review when 
faced with a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence is to view the evidence, and the facts 
reasonably to be inferred therefrom, in the 
light most favorable to the determination 
made by the trier of fact.1 We will only 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that a reasonable person could 
not possibly have determined guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.2 
The evidence was that defendant's identifi-
cation card and mail addressed to him were 
found in the residence. Phone service was in 
his name. The neighbors testified that 
defendant had lived there with defendant 
Gary Fox over a period of three years and 
that they had constructed the greenhouse 
which was only accessible through a door off 
the kitchen. No one else but defendant was 
identified as living in the house. Items of 
men's clothing were in the bedrooms, dirty 
dishes were in the sink, beds were unmade, 
and food was stocked in cupboards and in 
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the refrigerator, all of which indicated the 
house was used as a dwelling. 
The entire house was a virtual marijuana 
production center. The attached greenhouse 
was filled with growing marijuana plants 
which made the premises uncomfortably 
humid. The doorway from the kitchen 
afforded an unobstructed view of the greenh-
ouse and its contents. A large bag of 
harvested marijuana was found in the 
kitchen, a common area of the house likely to 
be used daily by the occupants. 
It was certainly reasonable to infer that not 
just one but both defendants knew of the 
greenhouse and its contents, had the power 
and intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the marijuana, and were jointly engaged 
in growing the marijuana and holding it for 
sale. 
I would affirm the convictions of both def-
endants. 
Howe, Justice, concurs in the concur-
ring and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice 
Hall. 
1. State v. McCardeil, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 
945 (1982). 
2, Id. 
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DURHAM, Justice: 
This is an appeal from an entry of partial 
summary judgment in favor of the responde-
nts, Ronald D. Jones and Pamela Jones Cl-
ones"). Jones brought a quiet title action on 
a parcel of real property, and the appellants, 
American Coin Portfolios, Inc. and 
Oakwood Manor Co. (hereinafter jointly 
referred to as "American Coin"), countercla-
imed to foreclose an alleged lien on the same 
property. American Coin made a motion for 
summary judgment against Jones, which the 
trial court denied. In the order denying 
American Coin's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court found that 
American Coin had no security interest in the 
property. 
As a result of that finding American Coin 
stipulated to an entry of a partial summary 
judgment in favor of Jones. Although there 
are multiple parties in this case, that partial 
summary judgment finally adjudicated the 
respective rights of Jones and American 
Coin. Therefore, the district court directed 
the entry of final judgment, finding that 
there was no just reason for delay pursuant 
to Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. P. 
American Coin now seeks to have this 
Court reverse the partial summary judgment 
and direct the trial court to enter judgment in 
its favor or, alternatively, to vacate the 
partial summary judgment and remand the 
case for further proceedings. We reverse and 
direct the trial court to enter judgment in 
favor of American Coin. 
The transactions that created the security 
interest in question were between American 
Coin and another defendant to the quiet title 
action, L. H. Investment Co., which is not a 
party to this appeal. After a series of transac-
tions between L. H. Investment and 
American Coin wherein the property had 
been used as collateral, the property was 
conveyed by L. H. Investment to Jones. A 
description of the transactions between 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Ronald D. JONES and Pamela Jones, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
AMERICAN COIN PORTFOLIOS, INC., a 
California corporation; Robert G. Holt, as 
Trustee, L. H. Investment Company, a Utah 
partnership, and L. H. Investment Group, a 
Utah corp., 
Defendants and Appellant. 
American Coin Portfolios, Inc., a California 
corporation, and Oakwood Manor Co., a 
California partnership, 
Counterclaim and Cross-claim Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Ronald D. Jones, Pamela Jones, Carl E. 
Barnes, Mary Barnes, L. H. Investment 
Company, a Utah partnership, L. H. Invest-
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Rotpondont, 
v. 
John Leo SCHROFF, Dofondant and 
Appellant. 
No. 13308, 
Supreme (Jourt of Utah. 
Oct. 3, 1973. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
District Court, Washington County, J. 
Harlan Burns, J., of violating statute pro-
scribing the cultivation and production of 
marijuana, a controlled substance, and he 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., 
held that evidence that defendant was ob-
served crossing corn fields near areas 
where marijuana was growing and was lat-
er observed picking leaves from one of the 
plants and placing them in a plastic bread 
wrapper sack, while sufficient to support a 
charge that defendant was in possession of 
marijuana, was insufficient to support con-
viction of cultivating and producing mari-
juana. 
Reversed; information dismissed. 
Henriod, J., concurred and filed opin-
ion. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion, 
in which Crockett, J., concurred. 
Drugs and Narcotics <*=>I09 
Evidence that defendant was observed 
crossing corn fields near areas where mar-
ijuana was growing and was later observed 
picking leaves from one of plants and plac-
ing them in a plastic bread wrapper sack, 
while sufficient to support a charge that 
defendant was in possession of marijuana, 
was insufficient to support conviction of 
cultivating and producing marijuana. U. 
C.A.1953,58^7-3(l)(a)(i). 
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Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and re-
spondent. 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romncy, Atty. Gen., David L. 
Wilkinson, William T. Evans, Asst. Attys. 
514 P 2d—30V* 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The defendant was charged in the court 
below with the violation of Section 58-37-
8(i)(a)(i). U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The 
charging part of the information alleges 
that on or about the 8th day of August, 
1972, at Santa Clara, Washington County, 
Utah, the defendant did cultivate and pro-
duce marijuana, a controlled substance. 
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty, 
and subsequently a trial was had and the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty of the of-
fense charged in the information. 
On August 5, 1972, one LaVar Brachcn 
discovered that in one of his fields some-
one was cultivating two small patches of 
plants which he suspected were marijuana. 
The sheriff of Washington County was 
notified and on the same day the sheriff 
and Brachen made an examination of the 
areas. The plants were growing on high 
ground and were not watered by irrigation 
of the other farming areas. Depressions 
had been made adjacent to the plants and 
the ground surrounding the plants was 
moist. Buckets and jugs were found near 
a creek which was a short distance from 
the areas above mentioned. Footprints led 
from the areas to the creek. Thereafter 
the sheriff and his men placed the areas 
under surveillance. On or about the 7th 
day of August, the defendant was observed 
crossing one of the fields near the areas 
where the marijuana was growing. On 
August 8th, the defendant was observed 
picking leaves from one of the plants and 
placing it in a plastic bread wrapper sack. 
The sheriff placed the defendant under ar-
rest and charged him with the offense we 
are here concerned with. The sheriff tes-
tified that after the defendant was in cus-
tody he made a statement in substantially 
the following language: "Why didn't we 
go catch some of these junkies that were 
peddling dope and leave us with our mari-
juana alone?" 
It is the defendant's contention here that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the 
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charge against him that he did cultivate 
and produce marijuana. With this conten-
tion we must agree. The evidence taken 
as whole would only support a charge that 
the defendant was in possession of mari-
juana. Possession alone is insufficient to 
show that the defendant cultivated or pro-
duced the substance. We conclude that the 
defendant's conviction must be reversed 
and it is ordered that the information be 
dismissed. 
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs. 
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring): 
I concur, believing the State did not 
prove its charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant did "cultivate and 
produce" marijuana. "Cultivate" seems to 
be surplusage and not in the statute.1 One 
cannot tell whether the jury thought de-
fendant "cultivated" or "produced" or "cul-
tivated and produced." Assuming it 
thought defendant "produced" the plant, 
there is no evidence that he did. Assum-
ing it thought he simply "cultivated" the 
plant, there is no such offense. Assuming 
it thought he both "cultivated and pro-
duced" the plant, he is not guilty for sever-
al reasons: 1) The information is in the 
conjunctive, and not severable, and defend-
ant should not be convicted of something 
not in the statute; 2) there is no evidence 
defendant "produced" the marijuana, and 
none about his "cultivating" it,—albeit had 
there been he would not have been guilty 
of a statutory offense; 3) the facts recited 
in the dissent do not show culpability, ex-
cept if we take gratuitous facts added but 
not found in the record nor in the opinion, 
when it says, after remarking that some-
body was certainly cultivating, the plants 
(see footnote), that "They were\his plants" 
and that "he was giving them pis atten-
tion." 
1. 58-87-8(1)(a)(1), U.C.A.1053, as amended, 
which aays it it unlawful to "Produce, man-
ufacture or dispense . . 
2. It eeetna obrioaa that the trial judge was 
referring to the statute which doea not say 
"cultivation" ia part of the offense. 
It is submitted that there are numerous 
hypotheses indulgable in this case just as 
consistent with innocence as guilt. An in-
struction as to this principle should have 
and perhaps was in substance given, which, 
if not adhered to by the jury would have 
resulted in reversible error on conviction. 
However, in this case, the jury did not 
have, by way of inference, any alternative 
but to conclude that the whole backbone of 
this case was broken perforce by legal un-
dernourishment. 
To the contention made in the dissent 
that the "concurring opinion seems to be 
unduly technical" because 1) it raises mat-
ters not claimed as error on this appeal 
and never questioned in the trial court'* 
and 2) that anyway "cultivate" and "pro-
duce" are synonymous terms: 
As to 1): The record reveals the follow-
ing: 
MR. PARK: At this time the state 
has rested, the defendant moves the. 
court to dismiss this cause as to cultiva-
tion and production for the cause and 
reason that there hasn't been shown any 
cultivation or production . . . . 
THE COURT: . . . it is true the 
state of Utah* does not use the word 
cultivation. The court hasn't instructed 
the jury on the proposed instructions or 
prepared any instructions with respect to 
cultivation . . . . The court is going 
to take the motion under advisement 
And again, counsel for defendant, at the 
time the parties had rested and were given 
their opportunities to make exceptions, 
made the following exception: 
MR. PARK: The defendant hereby 
objects to Instruction No. 13 s for the 
cause and reason that the instruction is 
3. "You are instructed that . . . it it un-
lawful and a felony for any person know-
ingly to product a controlled substance, in this 
case marijuana." (Significantly, the word 
"cultivate" ia left out of the instruction but 
appears in the information's charge of the of-
fense) 
STATE v. 
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inconsistent with the information as it 
states that the defendant must only 
knowingly and intentionally produce a 
controlled substance; said instruction 
should state that the defendant should 
knowingly and intentionally cultivate and 
produce a controlled substance. 
I recognize that the defendant did not 
claim error on appeal as a specific "Point 
on Appeal/' but this case being a criminal 
case of felony magnitude, involving a pos-
sible prison sentence and record, I think 
defendant's statement in his brief that 
"The transcript is devoid of any evidence 
connecting the defendant with tilling of 
the soil, planting, watering or fertilizing 
any marijuana plants/' should be consid-
ered as at least an unorthodox but none-
theless intended effort to apprise this 
court of a matter prejudicial in one degree 
or another to his interest, based on the dif-
ferential between improper accusation and 
any attempt to correct it by a so-called cu-
rative instruction 
As to 2) above, a rather strange develop-
ment appears to have taken place with re-
spect to the meaning of the word "culti-
vate." Mr. Justice Ellett is quite right that 
Webster's International Dictionary, Second 
Edition, published in 1945, has as one of 
its definitions of "cultivate" the words "to 
produce by culture." 4 Since that time Mr. 
Webster has had a change of heart and in 
his Third Edition, published in 1959, the 
definition quoted by Mr. Justice Ellett does 
not appear. .This author ventures the sug-
gestion that the phrase was deleted because 
it was quite irreconcilable with the other 
supposedly synonymous definitions of "cul-
tivate" as to have caught the lexicogra-
pher's eye. For instance, one of the 
word's definitions in both editions U "to 
loosen or break up the soil about (growing 
crops or plants) for the purpose of killing 
weeds." Marijuana generally has been 
tagged as a "weed," so that by the latter 
definition the charge in the information 
would have to have been that defendant 
was "Killing Weeds and Producing Plants" 
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which has no semblance of synonymity as 
suggested by Mr, Justice Ellett At any 
rate, Webster saw fit to correct an abor-
tion of the word, and all we of the majori-
ty seek to do is to correct a miscarriage of 
the charge, and the interment of a highly 
confusing accusatory procedure, whose 
memory otherwise might live for quite a 
spell behind bars after a conviction born of 
error by the state. 
For the dissent to say that any error 
committed here was harmless in view of 
the instruction given,—which actually com-
pounded the initial error,—seems to be a 
conclusion found only in the eyes of the 
beholder, and not in the statute, nor in the 
charge found in the eager information, nor 
in the inadequacy of the instruction, nor in 
the minds of the veniremen, whose verdict 
was "we find the defendant GUILTY of 
the felony of 'Producing and Cultivating 
Marijuana' as charged in the Information 
on file herein," nor in the main opinion, 
nor, frankly, this author believes, in any 
sufficiency of evidence if presented to a 
jury under proper charge and proper in-
structions. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent. I could have based my dissent 
on the facts as stated in the main opinion, 
but I do not do so, for there is more to be 
said about the matter. 
The defendant neither testified nor pro-
duced any evidence at trial, and, therefore, 
the evidence on behalf of the State is un-
contradicted. That evidence showed that a 
trail led up a steep, sandy bank from a 
creek to some willow brush on top. Some 
of the brush had been cut away so that the 
sun could shine on seven or eight marijua-
na plants. The land was owned by a 
stranger to the defendant, and the owner 
had given no one authority to grow mari-
juana or any other plants on his land. 
There were several five-gallon cans beside 
the creek apparently used to carry water 
up the trail to the plants. Each plant was 
growing in an artificially-made depression 
4. Arguendo, it it attuned that "culture" was related to "cultivate." 
